***APSA 2019 Panel for Related Group IPSA RC 36***

***Populism and Power***

***Abstract***

 The rise of populism has been pronounced over the past several years. The political movement has usurped the powers of more centrist governments that have dominated politics in the post war world. The papers in this panel analyze the power dynamics of this changing political landscape.

***Chair***

Emy Matesan, Wesleyan University, imatesan@wesleyan.edu

***Papers***

Philip Cerny, University of Manchester and Rutgers University and Gaye Gungor, Université Clermont Auvergne; pgcerny@gmail.com; gaye.gungor@uca.fr

***"Globalization, Populism and the Crisis of National Democracy"***

Abstract: Globalization undermines democracy in two main interacting ways -- by creating a range of socio-economic losers and by undermining national cultural-political identities. Global responses are seen to be both undesirable and ineffective, leading to anachronistic -- and even more ineffective -- nationalistic backlashes.

Judit Fabian, University of Calgary, judit.fabian@ucalgary.ca

***“The Golden Triangle of Nationalism, Gender and the Economic”***

Abstract: The paper predominantly focuses on the 20th century, and on how ‘moments of trouble’ occur when one dimension is subject to significant dislocation, precipitating significant change in the other two, and resulting in an unbalance between the three dimensions of governance. This is of particular importance for understanding the ongoing economic crisis; those who have focused on post-1989 economic restructuring have rarely understood this dynamic. Therefore, economic restructuring has given rise to unexpected dislocations of populist nationalism and gender scripts. Over time, the research will address several national contexts; this initial contribution begins to address the case of Hungary, with further examples from Japan and Germany.

Renee Marlin-Bennett, Johns Hopkins University, marlin@jhu.edu

***“Militarism, Populism, and Power”***

Abstract: This paper explores the nature of militarism and populism as contagions and seductions that spread through society as a particular form of information is communicated through networks. Content valorizing militarism and popularism is created and then flows through traditional and social media.  Manipulating content, controlling speeds of information flows, determining the flows’ directions, and creating or preventing access to information flows can be seen as micro-instances of power, which accrete and propagate, thereby acting on the emotions and cognition of susceptible individuals.  These information flows are phenomena (behaviors) that happens within states and yet also seems to produce reflective militarisms and popularisms across national borders. Both militarism and populism can be understood as overflows – that is, as excesses of emotional attachments.  Militarism and populism can also both be understood as tangled up with each other – that attachments to one often are seen in conjunction with attatchments to the other.  More complexly, they are also tangled with more positive sentiments that also are reproduced in information flows: patriotism, national identity, and even “family.”  This paper will clarify these concepts, drawing on scholarship regarding militarism and populism and illustrating conceptual innovations with empirical examples.

Sarah Wiliarty, Wesleyan University, swiliarty@wesleyan.edu

***“Reciprocal Relationship? How the German Christian Democrats Manage the Rise of the Alternative for Germany”***

Abstract: For decades, one motto of the German Christian Democrats had been “No party to our right.” As the party of the mainstream right, many Christian Democratic leaders saw it as their duty to prevent a rise of a radical right wing party by positioning the CDU and especially the CSU so that more extremist voters could find a legitimate political home with the Christian Democrats. This strategy – combined with the five percent threshold necessary for parties to enter the Bundestag and the constitutional provision against pro-Nazi activities – was largely successful until the 2017 election when the Alternative for Germany (AfD) entered the Bundestag for the first time. This paper examines how the CDU/CSU has responded to the AfD since the party’s emergence in 2013. During her tenure as party chair and Chancellor, Angela Merkel has guided (or nudged) the Christian Democrats in the direction of the political center. Many would argue that by doing so, Merkel contributed to the creation of a political vacuum on the right side of the spectrum that the AfD has been eager to fill. Since the rise of the AfD, mainstream political parties have attempted to respond in a way that will keep the party’s gains in check. This paper analyzes the strategies undertaken by the Christian Democrats to manage the rise of the AfD.

*Discussant*

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