The Faces of Power Revisited

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 Googling “faces of power” takes one directly to entries for *the three* faces of power and Steven Lukes. The title of this symposium—“The Changing Faces of Power”—rightly suggests that the faces of power were not set in stone in 1974 and even leaves open the possibility that there may be more than three. Scholarly discussion of “the faces of power” is intellectual residue of a famous debate in political science usually labeled “the community power debate.” This essay does not purport to provide either an overview or an in-depth analysis of this debate, but rather focuses on aspects of the debate that I believe have been overlooked, misinterpreted, forgotten, and/or which deserve further discussion. Lest I be accused of discussing “Hamlet” while ignoring the prince, I will include consideration of the late Robert Dahl. Without Dahl, it is difficult to imagine the faces of power and perhaps even the community power debate itself.[[1]](#footnote-1) This is not to say that Dahl was the first to consider the issues raised by the community power debate.

*Roots of the Debate*

 The intellectual roots of the community power debate are many and varied. Some would include Aristotle’s discussion of oligarchy or Machiavelli’s advice on governing, since both were concerned with smallish communities. Others who have called attention to governing elites include Marx, who characterized government as “the executive committee of the bourgeoisie,” and the Italian school of elite theorists, including Robert Michels, Gaetano Mosca, and Vilfred Pareto.

 American precursors of the debate include Helen and Robert Lynd whose study of Muncie, Indiana entitled *Middletown* in 1929 became a classic in sociology, Floyd Hunter, who studied elites in Atlanta, Georgia, and C. Wright Mills whose book entitled *The Power Elite* (1956) offered a similar argument about rule by elites at the national level of American politics.

*Landmarks in the Debate*

 The literature on the community power debate is voluminous and beyond the scope of this essay.[[2]](#footnote-2) There are, however, three landmark contributions that form the core of the debate—Dahl’s *Who Governs?* (1961), Bachrach and Baratz, “Two Faces of Power”(1962), and Lukes’ *Power: A Radical View* (1974). Dahl’s book was subtitled “Democracy and Power in an American City.” In order to determine the distribution of influence in New Haven, Dahl examined decision making in three issue-areas—urban redevelopment, public education, and political party nominations. Those who successfully initiated policy proposals in these areas were judged to be the most influential. The overall conclusion was that the most influential people were not the same for each issue area—the “pluralist” conclusion.

 A year after the publication of *Who Governs?* Bachrach and Baratz published an article in the *American Political Science Review* criticizing the book for focusing on “the ability to initiate and veto proposals” while ignoring the ability to prevent proposals from even being considered in the first place. In essence, their argument was that influence can derive from the ability to suppress issues or to keep them off the agenda of decision makers. This article was enormously influential and was identified as the most cited article published in the *American Political Science Review* between 1945 and 2005. To the best of my knowledge, this article was the first to refer to a particular form or dimension of power as a “face.”

 Twelve years after the publication of the famous article by Bachrach and Baratz, Lukes picked up on the title of the article and proposed yet a third “face.” This third face suggested that in addition to agenda control, issues could be suppressed (or promoted) by socializing the influence. During the next thirty years, references to Dahl’s approach as “one-dimensional,” that of Bachrach and Baratz as “two-dimensional,” and that of Lukes as “three-dimensional” became commonplace.

*The Community Power Debate in Retrospect*

 It has now been nearly sixty years since the publication of *Who Governs?*. In retrospect, I will address four questions: (1) Why should we care? (2) Who participated? (3) What was it about? (4) How many faces?

*Why care?* Many would date the community power debate somewhere between the 1950s and the 1980s. Why then continue to beat a horse that has been dead for forty years? The situation calls to mind the observation by William Faulkner that “the past is never dead. It’s not even past.” Even in the twenty-first century, it is common (perhaps even obligatory?) to begin a discussion of power by citing Dahl’s “Concept of Power,” his *Who Governs?*, and/or the community power debate. Many of the issues in the debate remain unresolved, and some of the participants have updated and revised their arguments, the second edition of Lukes’ *Power: A Radical View* being a case in point.

*Who participated?* The debate has been variously described as between political scientists and sociologists, between behaviorists and quasi-Marxists, between elitists and pluralists, and/or between Dahl and his critics. Describing it as a debate between Dahl and his critics, however, is somewhat misleading since Dahl is more accurately described as a target for his critics than as an active participant in the debate. Shortly before his retirement, he observed that he had not wanted to spend his time answering critics and mused that he may have “done less of that than [he was] properly obliged to do.”[[3]](#footnote-3) Dahl’s reluctance to engage his critics may have accounted for subsequent misunderstandings of his views.

*What was it about?* One answer to this question contends that the debate was about the concept of power and, furthermore, that it showed Dahl’s concept of power to be defective—or, at least narrow, restrictive, and one-dimensional. According to this interpretation, Dahl’s concept of power could not account for the exercise of power through the agenda control discussed by Bachrach and Baratz or the consciousness control discussed by Lukes. I contend, however, that the community power debate had little or nothing to do with the abstract concept of power explicated by Dahl in his classic essay. Bachrach and Baratz never cite the 1957 article and focus their argument on one of the six operational definitions of influence in *Who Governs?,* namely, the ability to initiate successful proposals and/or veto others. Lukes confuses matters by introducing the idea of a “view” of power, which he distinguishes from an abstract “concept” of power. For Lukes, a “view” of power represents a way “of identifying cases of power in the real world.” (1974, p. 27) This would seem to correspond to what social scientists call an operational definition, operational measure, or empirical indicator of power.[[4]](#footnote-4)

 Lukes (2015) admits that the concept of power discussed in Dahl’s 1957 essay subsumes what he calls the second and third faces of power but argues that this concept is too broad to be the one “that actually drove the research of *Who Governs?”* “What we require from a concept of power,” Lukes argues, is “a guide to questions and an orientation for research.” (p. 262-63) What Lukes *requires* from a definition of power would appear to differ from that of his fellow sociologist, Marion Levy (1969, p. 99):

The science game . . . requires that one apply the principle of parsimony to definitions as well as to other things. One uses a definition as economically as possible to identify what it is one wishes to refer to and keep it as distinct as possible from everything extraneous that might be confused with it. The greater the number of elements in the definition the greater the number of things made true by definition. It is always a mistake to single out the “most important” elements of the thing concerned for parts of the definition because that makes all of those important elements true by definition.

In addition to (or instead of?) the above requirements, Lukes expects concepts to “drive research” (whatever that means) and to provide “a guide to questions and an orientation for research.” This is asking concepts to do a lot of unnecessary work. “Drivers of research,” questions, and research orientations can be derived from many sources, e.g., love, hate, fear, hope, class consciousness, curiosity, existing theories, desire to improve, desire to destroy, or from the inscription on Karl Marx’s tombstone: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it.” The point is that there are a great many ways to derive questions and research orientations other than from a concept. Having found Dahl’s concept of power lacking in fulfilling his “requirements,” Lukes observes that “Dahl’s critics were led to reconstruct” the concept of power in *Who Governs?* They then proceed to find this reconstructed concept of power “overly narrow and in need of broadening.” Thus, although Dahl himself explicitly pointed to the 1957 article as providing the conceptual underpinnings of the book, Lukes and other critics seem to have substituted their own interpretation for Dahl’s.

 If the community power debate was not about the abstract concept of power, what was it about? I suggest that the debate was primarily focused on methodology and operational definitions. Various reviews of the debate emphasize methodological issues and operational definitions but give scant attention, if any, to the abstract concept of power.[[5]](#footnote-5) As noted above, Bachrach and Baratz focus entirely on the operational definition concerning initiating and vetoing proposals, which is only one of the six operational measures used in the book. The other five operational definitions oddly receive relatively little attention from the critics and none from Lukes or Bachrach and Baratz.

 To the extent that an abstract concept played a role in the community power debate, it was democracy not power. Lukes describes the debate as being about the “adequacy” of American democracy, but he fails to provide criteria for judging the adequacy of democracy. A more accurate title for the debate would have been “the community democracy debate.”

*How many faces of power?* The standard answer to this question is three, but some would argue that Michel Foucault identified yet a fourth face of power.[[6]](#footnote-6) I shall leave discussion of the alleged fourth face to others. The conventional narrative about power now depicts Dahl’s view of power as the one-dimensional first face of power, Bachrach and Baratz’s view as the two-dimensional second face, and Lukes’ view as the three-dimensional third face of power. Although Lukes was careful to distinguish the terms “view” and “concept” from one another, unfortunately, it is now standard practice to use these terms interchangeably. I shall now reluctantly follow this practice.

 There is no doubt that the faces of power elucidated by Bachrach and Baratz and by Lukes are important dimensions of power relations. They are not only important in their own right but have stimulated research by others on these dimensions. It is unfortunate, however, that their work has given rise to a misleading narrative about Dahl’s position with respect to such matters. Any suggestion that he was unaware of or oblivious to these dimensions of influence or that his concept of power was defective and could not subsume them is difficult to defend. In 1953, Dahl and Lindblom published *Politics, Economics, and Welfare*, which treats many topics of continuing relevance to an understanding of power, including agenda control, control of another actor’s subjective field and personality, direct control, indirect control, cooperation, bargaining, and more. Furthermore, *Who Governs?* itself contains discussion of instances of both the second and third faces. In 1971 Frey noted that this book, “the fulcrum of the debate, is replete with trenchant insights into the role of nonissues, political myths, dominant values, belief systems, preferential rules of the game, and cultural predilections as factors of extreme importance in New Haven politics.”[[7]](#footnote-7) The second edition of Dahl’s *Modern Political Analysis*, published in 1970, devoted a section to “the many faces of power,” which noted that “power does indeed have many faces. With perseverance, one could define literally thousands of different types of in influence.” (p. 25) A footnote to this passage points out that in the Italian translation of the first edition, he had shown “how some 14,000 different types might be derived.”[[8]](#footnote-8) Other than Lasswell and Kaplan (1950), no one has done more to promote the idea of power as multidimensional than Dahl; yet he is viewed by many contemporary scholars as having a “one-dimensional” view of power. That someone who has identified 14,000 faces of power should be widely viewed as “one-dimensional” is more than a little ironic.

Lukes Reconsiders

 In 2005, some thirty years after publication of Power: A Radical View, Lukes published a second edition, which modified the original argument in three significant ways: (1) context and focus; (2) the relationship between interests and power; and (3) the nature of interests.

 The debate between pluralists and elitists concerned the question of whether communities, especially New Haven, were governed by a small monolithic group or a diverse pluralistic group. One of the charges against the pluralists was that their concepts and methods predetermined their conclusions. In the 1974 edition, Lukes defended the pluralists from this charge. In discussing the context and focus of the 1974 edition in 2005, Lukes describes the central focus as how “the powerful secure the compliance of those they dominate,” which he admits is “a narrower question than that suggested by its snappy title.” (2005, 110.) This question assumes that domination is occurring and proceeds to ask how it occurs. Whereas in 1974 Lukes declared his “three-dimensional view” to be superior to alternative views in that it provided a broader, deeper, and more satisfying analysis of power then alternative approaches, the second edition admits that the original edition was narrowly focused on why people submit to domination. “Power as domination,” he now admits, “is only one species of power.”(2005, p.12.)[[9]](#footnote-9)

 The single most important difference between Dahl’s 1957 concept of power and that proposed by Lukes in 1974 was the requirement that the power of A always be detrimental to the interests of B—by definition. In 2005, Lukes admits that this was a mistake, pointing to seat belts, teaching, and parenting as examples of power that could be beneficial to B’s interests. While abandoning this position, however, Lukes clings to the link between interests and power by requiring that power always be beneficial to the interests of A—by definition. This position, of course, makes it rather difficult to analyze Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, U.S. escalation of the Vietnam War, the U.S role in the Iraq War, and/or the parents that bankrupt themselves in order to send the kids to college.

 In 2015 (p. 269) Lukes takes note of Dahl’s objections to including interests in defining the concept of power but rejects them. He seems to accept Dahl’s argument that including interests in the definition of power makes power analysis more difficult and complicated than it already is, but contends that “if the concept of interests is needed in clarifying and extending our understanding of power and power relations, then these difficulties may just have to be faced.” He ignores, however, Dahl’s most compelling argument for treating the concepts of interests and power separately: “If . . . we make the definitions of the two terms independent of one another, we can still say anything we would otherwise be able to say about power and interests.” (Dahl, 1991, p. 31. Italics in original.) At this point, the reader might find it helpful to revisit Marion Levy’s observations on the benefits of parsimonious definitions noted earlier—especially the part about it being a mistake to include the most important elements of the thing in the definition. By this criterion, Lukes’ emphasis on the importance of interests in power analysis argues against including it in the definition. Lukes fails to identify any line of argument about interests and power that could not be made using separate definitions of the two concepts. Sometimes the exercise of power is in the power wielder’s interest, and sometimes it is not. This should be settled by empirical inquiry (and/or moral argument), not by definitional fiat.

 The third modification of Lukes’ views in the second edition concerns the nature of interests. Lukes admits that the treatment of power in 1974 was “inadequate” in assuming that actors had “unitary interests,” rather than acknowledging “the ways in which everyone’s interests are multiple, conflicting, and of different kinds.” (2005, pp. 12-13, 109) This opens up the question of “trade-offs” (opportunity costs) and has far-reaching implications for his discussion of Mathew Crenson’s (1971) study of air pollution in Gary, Indiana. In considering why steelworkers would submit to breathing “poison” air—presumably an instance of domination harmful to their (unitary) interests—Lukes repeatedly slips in the parenthetical assumption that there are no trade-offs between unemployment and pollution. This assumption, of course, goes to the heart of the matter.

 There is a whole academic discipline devoted to the study of situations in which actors must deal with multiple and competing ends (or interests). The concept of opportunity costs is central to the discipline of economics; yet costs (of any kind) play little or no role in either edition of Lukes’ booklet. Oddly, Lukes suggests that professional economists “have had little that is interesting to say about power.” (2005, 166) He seems to have overlooked the “interesting” contributions to the power literature by such Nobel Prize winners as John C. Harsanyi, Thomas Schelling, Herbert Simon,[[10]](#footnote-10) John Nash, and Lloyd Shapley—not to mention work by other economists, such as Oskar Morgenstern, Charles Lindblom, Mancur Olson, Jack Hirshliefer, and Kenneth Boulding. Schumpeter’s monumental History of Economic Analysis (1954) points out that Max Weber earned a Ph.D. in economics and held professorships in economics. His name might well be added to the list of economists who have made interesting contributions to the literature on power.

 The most puzzling omission in both editions is any mention of the work by Harsanyi (1962a, 1962b) on the opportunity costs of power. The catalyst for the original booklet—and its principal target—was Dahl’s Who Governs? In an appendix subtitled “The Definition and Measurement of Influence,” Dahl goes out of his way to call attention to “what promises to be a highly important addition to the analysis of influence” that had come to his attention “too late to be incorporated into this study.” (p. 330) He is referring to two forthcoming articles by Harsanyi on costs and power that he describes as explicitly bringing “out what is sometimes only implicit in the present volume, the importance of opportunity costs as dimensions of power and influence.” In later works, Dahl reiterated his view of the importance of Harsanyi’s contribution to the study of power. (1968; 1963; 1970)

Dahl’s Concept of Power: Enduring or Ever Changing?

 Lukes (2015) contends that the abstract concept of power explicated in Dahl’s 1957 article was too broad—so broad that it included accidental or unintended instances of influence. It is not self evident that this is true. Recall Dahl’s original formulation: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” (1957, 202-203) The key word here is “get.” If I ask A to get congressman B to support legislation banning smoking,” it seems clear that I am talking about intentionally causing him to support the legislation. In ordinary language, “getting” someone to do something implies purpose, not an accidental or unintended act. When a parent says “get a haircut” to a son, it implies purpose. Lukes not only makes it clear that he regards Dahl’s concept as too broad, he argues that Dahl himself came to the same conclusion:

Dahl himself obviously became dissatisfied with the excessive breadth of this early definition. It clearly failed to identify his own intuitive idea of power; hence his successive revisions of the abstract concept.” (Lukes, 2015, p. 262)

This interpretation contains a grain of truth, but there is an alternative interpretation that seems more compelling. Dahl’s Modern Political Analysis went through six editions between 1963 and 2003, and the definition of influence did change somewhat during that time. One revision was of fundamental importance—the focus on A’s preferences as leading to a change in B’s behavior. This change was incorporated into the definition in the third edition in 1976.(pp.30-31) Dahl explains that this is in response to a book published by his student Jack H. Nagel in 1975, The Descriptive Analysis of Power.[[11]](#footnote-11) The major advantage of this revision, according to Dahl, is that it makes it easier to take account of “the rule of anticipated reactions” described by Carl J. Friedrich in 1937.

 Lukes (2015) repeatedly refers to the “successive revisions” of Dahl’s concept of power, thus giving the impression of great inconsistency. Except for the admittedly important revision of Dahl’s 1957 concept of power in 1976, however, the revisions in the various editions of Modern Political Analysis are more accurately characterized as tweaks, explications, clarifications, adaptations, applications, and/or illustrations than as significant revisions. Explicating a concept and revising it are not the same thing. Describing the various ways in which humans vary in color, weight, height, gender, and behavior does not require “successive revisions” in the abstract concept of “human being.” And describing the various forms that power may take in different contexts does not require successive revisions in the underlying concept of power.

Conclusion: Faces of Power and Future Research

 Has the faces-of-power approach to power analysis run its course? Are there other approaches to power analysis worthy of attention? I would answer “no” and “yes.” There are still unsettled issues from the community power debate to be explored, as demonstrated by the second edition of Lukes’ booklet.[[12]](#footnote-12) Exploring the implications of the revisions and mistakes he discusses there is no small task. Also, those who would frame their research in terms of faces of power can thank Robert Dahl for identifying 13,997 faces of power in addition to the three identified by Lukes. Clearly, the horizon for future research exploring the dimensions of power is vast.

 I began this essay by pointing out what happens when one Googles the phrase “faces of power.” Should this be the case? Excessive focus on the faces of power and the community power debate diverts attention from other approaches to the study of power. The intellectual history of power analysis should not be confined to, or distorted by, discussion of the community power debate. In 1969, at the height of the community power debate, a collection of articles entitled Political Power: A Reader in Theory and Research (Bell, Edwards, and Wagner, 1969) was published. It contained twenty-seven entries, only five of which concerned the community power debate. Although the literature on community power and the literature on power analysis overlap, they are not the same thing. Sociologists, social psychologists, geographers, economists, philosophers, and political scientists have published works on power that have little or nothing to do with power in New Haven—or any comparable community. Russell, Lasswell and Kaplan, Simon, March, Riker, Cartwright, Wrong, Shapley and Shubik, Harsanyi, Boulding, Blau, Nagel, Tedeschi—the list goes on and on.

 Discussing power in the context of discussions of the requisites and adequacy of democracy is both common and appropriate, but it would be a mistake to limit discussions of power to that context. There is another equally important—perhaps more important—context in which clear thinking about power is needed. Students of international relations have traditionally focused their attention primarily on war—its causes, conduct, and prevention. Contributors to the literature on power in international relations include Ernst Haas, Kenneth Boulding, John Harsanyi, Arnold Wolfers, Quincy Wright, Karl Deutsch, Stephen Jones, Inis Claude, Hans Morgenthau, Harold Sprout, and many others. The lack of attention to the costs of power in discussions of democracy is unfortunate but not likely to threaten life as we know it on this planet. The same cannot be said about discussions of war. In international relations, clear understanding of the costs of power may be an existential requirement.

 Postscript on the Study of Political Power

 The conclusion of Dahl’s classic article on the concept of power takes the form of a Platonic dialogue. In that spirit, I shall end this essay with a dialogue between a first-year graduate student and retired professor who spent fifty years trying to come to terms with the analysis of political power.

Grad: The literature on political power is vast. How should I go about mastering it?

Prof: First, you should understand that you will never “master” it; but some ways of approaching it are better than others. I would not suggest that you begin with the community power literature. The landmark work by Lasswell and Kaplan entitled Power and Society (1950) was subtitled “A Framework for Political Inquiry.” The subtitle is important; it was not an exercise in philosophy per se, although its co-author was a philosopher. It was an attempt to facilitate rigorous and precise analysis of political power in the real world. This is important to note because some recent studies of power border on pure logomachy, or philosophical navel-gazing, rather than attempts to facilitate research on politics. It led directly to work by Herbert Simon, James March, and Robert Dahl that attempted to build on the foundations laid by Lasswell and Kaplan.

Grad: But what about the faces of power and the community power debate? Isn’t that important? Google and Wikipedia give me the impression that power analysis began there. And some advanced graduate students have suggested that I need not bother reading Who Governs? or Bachrach and Baratz, since they are summarized by Lukes.

Prof: All in good time. The community power debate and the faces of power are indeed important milestones in power analysis, but it should not be studied backwards. The fulcrum of the debate was Dahl’s case study of governance in New Haven. Before plunging into the debate, careful reading of Who Governs? is essential. Later critics of that work often misinterpreted it or reconstructed it in misleading ways, and Dahl’s unwillingness to engage his critics often left their errors and/or omissions in place. It is especially important not to assume that reading the booklet by Lukes in 1974 provides adequate understanding of Dahl’s book. Far too many graduate students have made that mistake. These graduate students often have no idea that all three faces of power are discussed in Who Governs? or that Dahl had identified thousands of faces of power several years before the appearance of Lukes’ pamphlet.

Grad: That is all well and good, but I have heard from more advanced graduate students that Dahl’s concept of power has been shown to be defective in the sense that it is primitive, narrow, restrictive, confined to overt conflict of preferences, and has been superseded by more sophisticated, more inclusive, and more nuanced concepts that yield deeper understanding. Besides, didn’t he keep changing his concept of power?

Prof: I would suggest that you read his work over a fifty year period and decide for yourself whether the conventional narrative you describe is accurate. Fortunately, there is a relatively painless way to do that. The six editions of his Modern Political Analysis provide a guide to the evolution of his thinking about power and influence. He did, of course, make one major revision in his definition in order to account for the famous “rule of anticipated reactions.” But you will have to decide for yourself whether the other so-called revisions constituted significant changes in his thinking or were mere clarifications and explications.

Grad: Are there bodies of scholarly work on power analysis other than the community power debate that I should consider?

Prof: Indeed there are. One of these is the work on social exchange and the reciprocal power discussed by Dahl in later editions of Modern Political Analysis.[[13]](#footnote-13) In addition, I would suggest that you peruse some works on power in international relations, including those by Morgenthau, Wolfers, Wright, Haas, Claude, Jones, Sprout, and Deutsch.[[14]](#footnote-14)

Grad: Is that all?

Prof: No, but it will give you a good start. There is much work yet to be done on the analysis of power and its many faces. I would, however, make one request. Please pay special attention to the costs of power, as this is not only a neglected aspect of power analysis but also a vitally important one.

Grad: Thank you professor. I will go get started.

Prof: Before you leave, I have one additional suggestion--you might want to start with one of the few examples of poetry ever to appear in the pages of the American Economic Review:

 Four things that give mankind a shove

 Are threats, exchange, persuasion, love;

 But taken in the wrong proportions

 These give us cultural abortions,

 For threats bring manifold abuses

 In games where everybody loses;

 Exchange enriches every nation

 But leads to dangerous alienation;

 Persuaders organize their brothers

 But fool themselves as well as others;

 And love, with longer pull than hate,

 Is slow indeed to propagate. (Boulding 1963, p. 434.)

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1. But for Dahl, there would not be 14,000 Google citations to a fifty page pamphlet published in 1974. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. For an overview of this literature, see Polsby (1980); Ricci (1980); Waste (1986); and Dowding (2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Baer, Jewell, and Sigelman (1991), p. 176. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Lukes (2015) disputes this interpretation and compares the distinction to one by John Rawls between a “concept” and a “conception.” The terminology used by moral philosophers, of course, may differ from that commonly used by social scientists. Compare King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), Goertz (2006), and Brady and Collier (2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. See Ricci (1980), Polsby (1980), Waste (1986), and Dowding (2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Digeser (1992). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Frey, 1971, p. 1092. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Dahl describes the process for calculating the 14,000 faces in a paper delivered at the 1964 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association and reprinted in Dahl (1997), pp. 295-296. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Domination is perhaps the most abused and ill-defined concept in the lexicon of power. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Although Simon won a Nobel Prize in economics, he was a political scientist by training, having received a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago, where he studied under Harold Lasswell and Charles Merriam. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. This important book has not received the attention it deserves from scholars writing on power. In the “Guide to Further Reading,” (2005 p. 163) Lukes dismisses Nagel’s book as “a study of influence, not power.” Considering that Nagel describes his proposed concept of power as “dispositive,” a bit more by way of explanation would have been helpful. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Lukes, of course, has not abandoned his insistence that the concept of power is “essentially contested.” I shall not repeat the arguments against this position that I discuss in *Power and International Relations* (2016, pp.62-66) or those put forth by numerous others, e.g., Oppenheim (1981); Macdonald (1976); Dowding (2006); Haugaard (2010); Lovett (2007); and McLachlan (1981). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. See also, Adam Smith (1776); Blau (1964); and Baldwin (1971;1978) on this point. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. For an overview of these works, see Baldwin (2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)